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OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS BELOW
The order and opinion of the United States District Court
for the District of New Union are unreported and are repro-
duced in the Joint Appendix, attached hereto as Appendix A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
New Union Roofing and Drywall (NURD) is a small 3-
employee roofing business known for its careful craftsman-
ship, painstaking attention to detail, and ability to always
meet deadlines. (J.A. 2). NURD was incorporated in 1981,
and operates exclusively in the one mile square "Moll's Gar-
dens" neighborhood of Cathertown, New Union. (J.A. 2-3).
From 1981 to 1983, NURD used a vacant lot located next to
its owner's home for its business operations. (J.A. 3). During
this time, NURD prepared batches of "roof acid" for removing
old shingles from an existing roof. (J.A. 3). Roof acid comes
in a powder form and is manufactured exclusively from natu-
ral ingredients, including several vegetable extracts. (J.A. 3).
Prior to application on a roof, the roof acid powder is mixed
with water. (J.A. 3).
When NURD employees prepared too much roof acid for
a roofing job, the employees, in good faith and without any
awareness that roof acid is a listed hazardous waste under
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), mixed the
excess roof acid with leftover fruit juice and put this mixture
into its compost pit. (J.A. 3). NURD composted leaves, grass
clippings and food scraps, believing that the vegetable ex-
tracts and other natural ingredients in the roof acid would
also add nutrients to the compost pit and enhance the soil.
(J.A. 3).
After NURD moved to a different location in 1984, it sold
the vacant lot to Brownfields Redevelopment Associates of
New Union (BRANU). (J.A. 4). BRANU is in the business of
buying industrial-type sites, performing any environmental
remedial action necessary for new development, and then
selling the property for a profit. (J.A. 3). At the time the va-
8951996]
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cant lot was sold, neither party was aware that a hazardous
substance had been disposed of on the property. (J.A. 4).
When the contamination was discovered, NURD readily
acknowledged that it disposed of the roof acid-fruit juice mix-
ture in the compost pit and cooperated fully with the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigation. (J.A. 4).
The roof acid used was of a technical grade, and while dis-
carded roof acid was listed hazardous waster under RCRA,
neither the roof acid alone nor the mixture which resulted
when mixed with soft drinks qualified as characteristic haz-
ardous waster under RCRA. (J.A. 4). BRANU remediated
the site in 1993 and a family now lives in the residence
BRANU constructed on the site. (J.A. 4).
B. Procedural History
BRANU timely filed suit against NURD in 1993 under
RCRA and under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) seeking
remediation damages of $200,000.00. (J.A. 4). EPA also com-
menced an action against NURD, seeking recovery of its
$100,000 in sampling and analysis costs of the soils and
groundwater at the Molls Garden site. (J.A. 4). The two ac-
tions were consolidated, with EPA participating as amicus on
the RCRA issue. (J.A. 4).
In April 1995, United States District Court Judge R. N.
Remus ruled in favor of NURD on both issues. Although
Judge Remus found that Congress was within its power to
enact RCRA § 7002, she held that NURD was not liable be-
cause there is no private cause of action for restitution cre-
ated under RCRA § 7002. (J.A. 6). On the second issue,
Judge Remus agreed that the mixture rule had been vacated,
and thus, NURD is not liable under CERCLA § 107. (J.A. 8).
BRANU and EPA have appealed the judgement to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the judgment of the District
Court on both issues. NURD is not liable to BRANU, first,
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/31
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because RCRA does not provide for private causes of action
for damages under § 7002. Second, RCRA's authority to reg-
ulate is granted via the Commerce Clause. NURD's business
activities do not "substantially" affect interstate commerce.
Therefore, RCRA § 7002 cannot regulate NURD's disposal of
waste. Furthermore, NURD is not liable under CERCLA or
the mixture rule for restitution damages. Contrary to EPA
and BRANU's argument, the mixture rule was vacated by the
D.C. Circuit Court, and its repromulgation fails to apply
retroactively.
The lower court properly found RCRA § 7002 authority
does not extend to restitution damages for private parties
when not acting as private attorneys general. The BRANU
lawsuit would fail to benefit society as a whole; instead its
benefit is for BRANU alone. Moreover, RCRA permits only
equitable relief. Damages years after the site cleaned up is
not a remedy granted in equity.
RCRA § 7002 also does not meet the criteria established
by the Supreme Court necessary to grant BRANU a private
cause of action in order to sue NURD for damages. Most sig-
nificantly, BRANU fails to demonstrate Congress implied a
private cause of action when it enacted the statute. Even so,
regardless of whether Congress intended to include an im-
plied private cause of action, NURD still escapes liability.
Recovery fails under § 7002, because the Molls Garden site
does not present the imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health and environment necessary for BRANU to
prevail.
Furthermore, congressional power to enact federal legis-
lation such as RCRA § 7002 is curtailed under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. NURD's business
activities do not meet the test of substantially affecting inter-
state commerce; therefore, as a national statute, RCRA
§ 7002 is not applicable to NURD.
The District Court was also correct in holding NURD free
from liability under CERCLA § 107. The disposal of roof acid
mixed in with fruit juice is not a hazardous waste under
CERCLA or RCRA. EPA's mixture rule is not relevant, since
the rule was vacated by the D.C. Circuit. EPA did not
8971996]
11
898 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
repromulgate the rule retroactively, consequently, there was
no valid mixture rule in place at the time of the roof acid -
fruit juice disposal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for the two questions presented
in this appeal is de novo. The first question concerns whether
the lower court correctly held that the citizens-suit provision
of RCRA does not provide for private causes of action for the
recovery of clean up costs. The second question is whether
the lower court properly interpreted hazardous waste under
CERCLA § 107. Questions of statutory interpretation are
questions of law properly reviewed under the de novo stan-
dard. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 1995).
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. NURD IS NOT LIABLE TO BRANU FOR SITE
RESTORATION COSTS BECAUSE RCRA § 7002
DOES NOT PERMIT RESTITUTION
DAMAGES IN A PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION, NOR DOES THE STATUTE
CONSTITUTIONALLY APPLY TO A LOCAL
BUSINESS SUCH AS NURD.
A. The district court correctly ruled that RCRA lacks
specific statutory authority to award monetary
damages to BRANU.
1. The citizens-suit provision of RCRA § 7002
authorizes only equitable relief.
RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) provides that "[t]he district court
shall have jurisdiction . . . to restrain any person who has
contributed or is contributing to the past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste.., to order such person to take such other
action as may be necessary, or both. . . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (1988). BRANU, however, is not asking to re-
strain NURD from hazardous waste disposal. BRANU is su-
ing to recover site restoration costs and to increase its net
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/31
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profits. (J.A. 4). BRANU originally purchased the Molls Gar-
dens site in 1990 as part of its business, which specializes in
acquiring industrial-type sites to remediate and sell at a
profit. (J.A. 3). The plain language of RCRA § 7002 simply
does not allow BRANU additional business profit through re-
covery of clean up costs. Rather, the statute authorizes only
equitable relief.'
BRANU's lawsuit under § 7002 for restoration costs is
not an equitable remedy. Granting monetary damages
makes BRANU the "direct beneficiary of substantive relief,"
and substantive relief cannot be characterized as equitable
relief. See Commerce Holding Co. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp.
441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). Moreover, "[a] plaintiff cannot
transform a claim for damages into an equitable action by
asking for an injunction that orders the payment of money."
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Auth. v. BMI Apart-
ments Assocs., 847 F. Supp. 380, 385 (E.D. Va. 1994)(quoting
Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3rd Cir. 1979)).
Therefore, BRANU's request for monetary damages cannot
be cloaked as a request for injunctive relief.
2. BRANU is not entitled to relief under § 7002
because it is not acting as a "private attorneys
general."
The citizens-suit provision in § 7002 quoted allows pri-
vate causes of action when private parties are "genuinely act-
ing as private attorneys general rather than pursuing a
private remedy." Commerce Holding, 749 F. Supp. at 445
(quoting Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714
F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1983)). In Commerce Holding, owners
of a commercial property listed as a hazardous waste site
1. Kaufman v. Unisys Corp., 822 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (N.D. Cal. 1993);
Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Auth. v. BMI Apartments Assocs., 847
F. Supp. 380, 385 (E.D. Va. 1994); Prisco v. State of N.Y., No. 91
CIV.3990(RLC), 1995 WL 548322, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1995); Furrer v.
Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1094 (8th Cir. 1995); Commerce Holding Co. v. Buckstone,
749 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); See generally John E. Sullivan, Implied
Private Causes of Action and the Recoverability of Damages Under the RCRA
Citizen Suit Provision, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 10408 (1995).
1996] 899
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brought suit against the former tenants seeking injunctive
and monetary relief under CERCLA, RCRA and common law.
Id. at 443. The tenants of the property discharged hazardous
wastes and declined to remediate the site. Id. The owners
were unable to recover because they were seeking a private
remedy and not acting as private attorneys general. Id. at
445. Private attorneys general do not receive direct benefits
from their causes of action. BRANU is allowed a private
cause of action under § 7002 only if it is genuinely acting as a
private attorneys general, insuring that society as a whole
benefits.
In its demand for restoration damages, BRANU is clearly
not acting as a private attorney general. Although the dis-
trict court can presumably use the full extent of its equitable
and legal powers to enforce RCRA regulations, it can only do
so when private citizens are acting as private attorneys gen-
eral. Environmental Defense Fund, 714 F.2d at 337. BRANU
is pursuing a private remedy against NURD and would di-
rectly benefit from an award of monetary damages. Remedia-
tion costs are a typical business expense of BRANU, and a
monetary award for such remediation costs would unjustly
enrich them. Accordingly, BRANU is precluded from recover-
ing clean up costs from NURD. Such an award is a private
remedy and contrary to the purpose of the statute.
B. RCRA § 7002 does not explicitly provide for private
causes of action for damages and none should be
implied absent substantial evidence of
Congressional intent.
BRANU incorrectly argues that the language "to order
... such action as may be necessary" implicitly creates a rem-
edy to recover remediation costs. See 42 U.S.C.
§6972(a)(1)(B) (1988). However, this language does not pro-
vide BRANU with site restoration damages because the stat-
ute itself does not provide such a private cause of action.
When analyzing whether Congress intended to create private
causes of action, a court must apply the four factor test set
forth by the United States Supreme court in Cort v. Ash: 1)
the plaintiff must be within the class for whose benefit the
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/31
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statute was enacted; (2) the legislative history must explicitly
or implicitly show an intent to create or deny a cause of ac-
tion; (3) the proposed remedy must be within the context of
the statutory scheme; (4) inferring a federal remedy must not
interfere with traditional matters of state law. 422 U.S. 66,
78 (1975). These factors have become the test by which im-
plied causes of action are found in federal statutes. In order
for BRANU to recover damages under RCRA § 7002, it must
meet the Cort test.
1. BRANU fails to establish the four Cort factors
relevant to find an implied private cause of
action.
a. BRANU is not in the class for whose benefit
§ 7002 was enacted.
In refusing to find an implied private cause of action
under § 7002, the Eighth Circuit held that the "benefit" of
RCRA is for all citizens of the United States. Furrer, 62 F.3d
at 1095. In Furrer, the plaintiffs were ordered to remediate
acquired property which was contaminated with petroleum.
Id. at 1093. After remediation, the plaintiffs sued to recover
their costs from the former owners and tenants. Id. The
court held that RCRA § 7002 is not for the "special benefit" of
landowners who pay for clean up costs of their property even
if they did not participate in the disposal of hazardous waste.
Id. at 1095. Likewise, RCRA is not for the "special benefit" of
BRANU. Congressional intent for a private cause of action
may be implied if ". . . the language of the statutes indicates
that they were enacted for the benefit of a class of which [the
plaintiff] is a member." Id. (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77,
91.92 (1981)). BRANU is not only a landowner, it is also a
for-profit business seeking a private remedy. BRANU's cause
of action for the recovery of damages would not benefit all the
citizens of the United States since the site has already been
remediated. (J.A. 4). Because BRANU is a for-profit busi-
ness and would specially benefit by a damage award, it falls
outside the class for whose benefit § 7002 was enacted.
9011996]
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b. Congress did not intend to create a private
cause of action under § 7002.
When deciding to imply a private cause of action for dam-
ages, the most important consideration is whether the Legis-
lature intended explicitly or implicitly to create such a cause
of action. Middlessex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). Express provisions
for private causes of action are conspicuously missing from
§ 7002; therefore, if such a remedy exists, it must be implied.
In fact, if Congress intended to create a private cause of
action for damages under § 7002, it could have written the
statute to include the remedy. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1096. In
comparison to RCRA, CERCLA does specifically include pri-
vate causes of action for damages. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). Congress' failure to include a similar
provision in § 7002 indicates a conscious decision not to pro-
vide the same remedy as CERCLA. Since "Congress knows
how to define a right to contribution" in federal environmen-
tal law, Congress "deliberately" did not include private
causes of action for the recovery of damages in § 7002. See
Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Ratliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 n.11 (1981)); but see KFC
W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir.) cert. granted 116 S.
Ct 41 (1995). Congress' specific inclusion of a private cause of
action in CERCLA strongly suggests there is no equivalent
implied remedy under RCRA.
Moreover, § 7002 expressly includes both prohibitory and
mandatory injunctive relief to stop the generation of hazard-
ous waste or force compliance with regulations. Furrer, 62
F.3d at 1097. The Supreme Court has been hesitant to imply
private causes of action in the area of federal environmental
law. "[W]here a statute provides a particular remedy or rem-
edies, a court must be chary of reading others into it."2 Three
2. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14-15 (holding no implied private
cause of action under the Federal Water and Pollution Control Act and Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act); See also California v. Sierra Club,




types of suits are available under § 7002. A citizen may sue:
(1) persons in violation of any "permit, regulation, condition,
requirement, prohibition, or order"; (2) persons who have
"contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal or
any solid or hazardous waste which may present an immi-
nent or substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment"; and (3) the EPA Administrator for not performing a
discretionary duty. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(A) - 6972(a)(2)
(1988). The "comprehensive character of the remedial
scheme expressly fashioned by Congress strongly evidences
an intent not to authorize additional remedies." Furrer 62
F.3d at 1097 (quoting Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 93-94).
Thus, Congress' enactment of express remedies in § 7002
demonstrates there was no intent to imply a private cause of
action.
Only the Ninth Circuit has held that RCRA affords a pri-
vate cause of action. KFC, 49 F.3d at 523. In KFC, the Ninth
Circuit erroneously adopted what they believed was the
Eighth Circuit's interpretation of a completely different sec-
tion of the RCRA, § 7003. See Id. RCRA § 7003 provides in-
junctive remedies for the EPA Administrator. See generally
John E. Sullivan, Implied Private Causes of Action and the
Recoverability of Damages Under the RCRA Citizen Suit Pro-
vision, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 10408 (1995). The court concluded
that § 7003 and § 7002 are similarly worded, and Congress
intended that citizens-suits should be governed by the same
standards of liability as governmental actions; so the relief of
the two provisions should be similar. KFC, 49 F.3d at 521-
522. This reasoning has been characterized as "a non se-
quitur that the remedies available to the respective plaintiffs
must be the same." Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1100. Moreover, the
EPA, as amicus in this case, disagrees with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning. (J.A. 1). The Ninth Circuit has clearly mis-
interpreted the statute by finding a private cause of action for
damages under RCRA § 7002.
In KFC, the court misconstrued two Eighth Circuit deci-
sions which did not address the issue of subject matter juris-
diction. Id. at 1101. Addressing the issue of subject matter
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jurisdiction, § 7002 simply does not provide for a monetary
remedy to recover cleanup costs. Id. Because the Ninth Cir-
cuit erroneously relied on decisions not addressing the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction, KFC is not controlling.
Furthermore, KFC mistakingly relied on legislative his-
tory stating that the 1984 amendment to § 7002 "confers on
citizens a limited right ... to sue to abate an imminent and
substantial endangerment pursuant to the standards of lia-
bility established under [§ 6973]." Id. at 1100. A plain read-
ing of the language indicates that citizens have the right to
"sue to abate." It does not say private citizens have the right
to sue for cleanup costs. Id. Legislative history also fails to
demonstrate that remedies available to private citizens are
the same as the remedies available to the EPA under § 7003.
Id. at 1101. Divining the legislative intent behind a federal
statute is difficult at best. Even KFC agreed the legislative
history "cut both ways." Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1101 (quoting
KFC, 49 F.3d at 522 n.3).
Finally, KFC concludes that it would be unfair and
against public policy not to allow a private cause of action for
damages under RCRA. KFC, 49 F.3d at 523. The court was
concerned that "innocent citizens" who had no part in creat-
ing the endangerment would be forced by the government to
remediate the site quickly. Id. Such a quick response would
not allow sufficient time to sue for the equitable relief ex-
pressly provided. Id. In a sharp dissent, Judge Brunetti cau-
tioned that even if private citizens may not have time to bring
enforcement injunctions, that alone should not precipitate a
legislative determination absent convincing evidence of legis-
lative intent. Id. at 527 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). Regard-
less, since BRANU was not required by the EPA to
immediately remediate the site, BRANU had ample time to
seek an injunction. (J.A. 4). Therefore, the public policy con-
cerns of the KFC court do not apply to BRANU.
More importantly, KFC emphasized that CERCLA did
not provide a private remedy because petroleum is not a haz-
ardous substance included in the statute. Therefore, it any
remedy was available for petroleum contamination, it must
be implied under RCRA. However, in the instant case, there
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was no petroleum contamination. BRANU can seek a private
remedy under CERCLA and common law principles including
nuisance, negligence or trespass. A cause of action under fed-
eral law should not be implied when based on tort principles.
See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
BRANU is not entitled to an implied cause of action under
RCRA § 7002 because it does not meet the public policy argu-
ment set forth in KFC, nor is it precluded from a private tort
remedy.
c. A private cause of action for damages under
§ 7002 is not "necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose" of the statute.
The third Cort factor determines whether the remedy
sought is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the leg-
islative scheme" of the statute. 422 U.S. at 78. Congress en-
acted § 7002 "to promote the protection of health and the
environment and to conserve valuable material and energy
resources." 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1988).
The purpose of the act has also been held "to prevent the
creation of hazardous waste in the first place, rather than
promote the cleanup of existing sites." Furrer, 62 F.3d at
1098. RCRA discourages citizens-suits, and "when compli-
ance is at hand," may not be commenced if the EPA or the
state is "diligently prosecuting" an enforcement suit. Id. The
statute provides citizens-suits "to abate" violations of the reg-
ulations. This phrase, "to abate" is included in the legislative
history, signifying that § 7002 was not intended to include
private remedies for damage recovery. See Id.
d. An implied private cause of action under
§ 7002 would frustrate the purpose
behind RCRA.
Finally, the last Cort factor concerns the relationship be-
tween federal law and state law. If the cause of action is "tra-
ditionally relegated to state law," no implied federal cause of
action should be found. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. However,
remediation of environmental hazards may not be strictly an
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area of state concern. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1099. The litigation
of pendant state claims brought with RCRA citizens-suits
was believed to potentially frustrate the prompt abatement of
imminent hazards. Id. RCRA contains a savings clause pre-
serving state law claims; therefore the Cort factor is neutral
and does not support the implication of a private cause of ac-
tion. Id. But because the first two Cort factors do not indi-
cate any congressional intent, the last two Cort factors are
not relevant here. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287, 298 (1981).
BRANU cannot maintain a private cause of action for the
recovery of cleanup costs under RCRA § 7002 because the
statute does not provide for such a remedy. Moreover, a pri-
vate remedy should not be implied because there is no con-
gressional intent supporting a private cause of action within
the language of the statute. Additionally, the Cort factors
used to determine whether congressional intent exists fail to
support implying a private cause of action. Other remedies
under common law exist under which BRANU may seek to
recover its cleanup costs. Therefore, the district court was
correct in holding RCRA does not provide private causes of
action for the recovery of damages. In fact, the recognition of
a private cause of action for damages would increase litiga-
tion in federal courts, ultimately frustrating the prompt pre-
vention of the generation of environmental endangerments.
2. Even if a private cause of action is implied, NURD
is not liable under RCRA § 7002 because the
Molls Garden site no longer presents an
imminent and substantial endangerment.
To prevail under the citizens-suit provision of § 7002,
BRANU must show that the waste disposed and stored at the
site "may present an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment." See Murray v. Bath Iron
Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33, 41 (D. Me. 1994). Actual harm
or risk of threatened or potential harm will suffice to main-
tain a cause of action. Id. BRANU's inability to demonstrate
imminent or substantial endangerment, or any risk of harm
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss2/31
MOOT COURT
at the Molls Garden site precludes it from prevailing under
§ 7002.
NURD last disposed of waste in 1983, and BRANU has
stipulated that the site was remediated in 1993. (J.A. 4). A
RCRA violation exists only "so long as the waste has not been
cleaned up and the environmental damage has not been suffi-
ciently remedied." Prisco, 1995 WL 548322 at *19. Because
the site has been remediated and a family is currently living
on it, BRANU fails to establish that an "imminent and sub-
stantial danger" exists. Since "only injunctive relief is avail-
able, wholly past violations of RCRA cannot be subject to
citizens-suits under § 7002 of the RCRA." Id. Therefore,
NURD cannot be liable to BRANU for any past violations
under § 7002.
C. NURD is not liable to BRANU because RCRA does not
apply to a local, intrastate business.
1. Congress' authority to enact RCRA only extends to
legislation that affects interstate commerce.
The Commerce Clause set forth in the United States
Constitution grants Congress power to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The goal under the Commerce Clause
is to regulate interstate commerce, or commerce between
states. It does not "comprehend... commerce, which is com-
pletely internal... and which does not extend to or affect
other states." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194
(1824). "The completely internal commerce of the State, then,
may be considered reserved for the State itself." Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (quoting Gibbons, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195). NURD's local roofing company is not
the type of economic activity affecting interstate commerce.
For example, large multi-state roofing company would qualify
as working in interstate commerce. NURD is a local business
operating in a very small area of one town. In other words,
NURD operates completely within the internal commerce of
the State of New Union. Congressional power to enact fed-
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eral legislation does not extend to regulating NURD's local
intrastate business.
Over time, the commerce clause has been interpreted to
apply federal legislation regulating an activity which "sub-
stantially affects" interstate commerce. See United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). Congress is granted the
power to regulate intrastate activities that "have such a close
and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce
from burdens and obstructions." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). Therefore, Congress does
not have the authority to regulate an intrastate business
such as NURD, whose business activity does not substan-
tially affect commerce between the states.
2. NURD's roofing business is so local in nature that
it does not affect interstate commerce, nor is it
an intrastate economic activity that
"substantially" affects interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court recently clarified that congressional
power to enact statutes under the commerce clause extends
to three broad categories of activity:
First, Congress may regulate the use of channels of inter-
state commerce .... Second, Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate ac-
tivities. . . . Finally, Congress' commerce authority in-
cludes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-1630. In considering all three cate-
gories, it becomes clear that NURD's business is not governed
by RCRA.
First, while RCRA § 7002 can be considered in many in-
stances as regulating the channels of interstate commerce, it
clearly is not with respect to NURD. RCRA governs the "han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal" of haz-
ardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a)(1)(B) (1988). Of course,
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state commerce. This has been demonstrated numerous
times with a variety of cases where the commerce clause has
been invoked to strike down restrictive state statutes limiting
the transportation of RCRA "hazardous waste" across state
lines. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978). And since navigable waterways have long been
considered essential to the channels of interstate commerce,
if NURD had disposed of a RCRA hazardous waste in a river
or stream, then NURD certainly would be subject to the
RCRA regulation. See generally Gibbons, 27 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1. However, NURD does not use any channels of interstate
commerce such as transportation across state lines, or navi-
gable waterways, for its business or for disposal of hazardous
waste. As such, NURD's business activity is not subject to
the first commerce clause category.
The second category empowers Congress to regulate in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce, such as aircraft or
vehicles used in interstate commerce. RCRA applies to haz-
ardous waste, not to an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce. The statute is not attempting to regulate
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and is not applica-
ble in the instant case.
Hence, the only way NURD would be subject to RCRA is
if its activities in any way have a substantial relation to in-
terstate commerce. But NURD is strictly a local industry.
All parties stipulate that NURD does not have any direct im-
pact on interstate commerce. (J.A. 5). Nor does NURD's
business have a sufficient relationship to interstate com-
merce. While the roof acid was manufactured in another
state, this alone is not sufficient to put NURD into interstate
commerce. In fact, the roof acid is analogous to the gun in
Lopez. A gun, although manufactured elsewhere and then
transported across state lines, is still not sufficient interstate
commerce to allow Congress to regulate its activity in a local
school yard. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624. Accordingly, the
purchase of roof acid, regardless of where it is manufactured,
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Even further removed from the "substantial" require-
ment is NURD's payroll to its employees. Indeed, if an em-
ployee paycheck was sufficient to qualify as interstate
commerce, than almost any law would be federal in nature
and not regulated by the states. It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to locate a business or a person who does not use
or buy items manufactured solely in its own state. In fact, in
today's market it is a challenge just to locate items manufac-
tured within the United States. More significantly, if a
paycheck or a manufactured item qualified as substantial in-
terstate commerce, then the Supreme Court would most cer-
tainly have upheld the gun law in Lopez. Schools employ and
pay numerous individuals, and purchase numerous items
such as textbooks, supplies, athletic equipment and furni-
ture. The Supreme Court's refusal in Lopez to recognize em-
ployee paychecks, or a manufactured item as "substantially
relating" to interstate commerce as sufficient to uphold a fed-
eral law, demands a similar outcome with respect to the case
at hand.
This Court's recognition that RCRA § 7002 does not ap-
ply to NURD will not require overturning the statute. Unlike
the regulation in Lopez, NURD is not advocating a reversal of
RCRA. The difference between the Gun-Free School Zones
Act and RCRA is while all school districts are local in nature,
not all businesses using roof acid are necessarily local in na-
ture. RCRA does legitimately apply through the commerce
clause to numerous businesses which are engaged in inter-
state commerce. However, the statute's authority to regulate
must be determined on a case by case basis. "Whether or not
particular action does affect commerce in such a close and in-
timate fashion as to be subject to federal control, and hence to
lie within the authority conferred... is left by the statute to
be determined as individual cases arise." Jones & Laughlin
Steel, 301 U.S. at 32. Since NURD's business activities and
its actions in disposing of roof acid in the compost pit are lo-




II. BRANU AND EPA CANNOT RECOVER UNDER
CERCLA FOR NURD'S DISPOSAL OF ITS
ROOF ACID MIXTURE.
All parties stipulate that the roof acid - fruit juice mix-
ture is not a characteristic waste under RCRA or CERCLA.
(J.A. 4). In addition, while a roof acid-water mixture is listed
as a hazardous waste under RCRA, the mixture of roof acid,
water, and fruit juice is not a listed hazardous waste either
under CERCLA or RCRA. The only way this dilution of an
otherwise hazardous waste could be legally classified as an
actionable hazardous waste would be under EPA's "mixture
rule." This mixture rule states that a mixture of a solid waste
with a listed hazardous waste qualifies as an actionable haz-
ardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv) (1995). However,
NURD cannot be liable under the mixture rule because it has
been binding only since 1992, nine years after NURD last dis-
posed of its roof acid mixture at the site in question. (J.A. 3).
A. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals clearly vacated the
mixture rule retroactively.
The D.C. Court of Appeals retroactively vacated the EPA
mixture rule in 1991, with the order officially taking effect in
1992. 3 In Shell, the petitioners challenged several EPA pro-
visions under § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). Id. The court held that since EPA did not follow the
APA's notice and comment procedure when it first promul-
gated the mixture rule, the rule was invalid as a matter of
law. More specifically, the mixture rule was not an implicit
intention or "logical outgrowth" of EPA's proposed RCRA reg-
ulations concerning hazardous waste. Id. at 752. This hold-
ing itself is enough to decide the issue, because the United
States Supreme court stated in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown that
a rule improperly promulgated through notice and comment
3. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (1991) (Appellants may try to
argue NURD's disposed waste is a hazardous waste under EPA's derived-from
rule. The derived-from rule was also struck down in Shell for the same reasons
as the mixture rule, and was repromulgated by EPA along with the mixture
rule. Any procedural argument about the mixture rule applies equally to the
derived from rule, and so the two will be analyzed together.).
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procedure has "no force or effect of law" and is void ab initio.
441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979). There is only one caveat to this
principle; as the D.C. Circuit acknowledged in Fertilizer Insti-
tute v. EPA (an opinion issued shortly before Shell), "when
equity demands, an unlawfully promulgated regulation can
be left in place while the agency provides the proper proce-
dural remedy." 935 F.2d 1303, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1991). How-
ever, a closer examination of the Shell opinion reveals the
D.C. Circuit did no such thing in the mixture rule context.
Thus, the rule has been binding only since 1992, when EPA
properly repromulgated it. 57 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1992).
1. The D.C. Circuit clearly intended to vacate the
mixture rule retroactively, not prospectively.
The Shell court stated "because the EPA failed to provide
adequate notice and opportunity for comment with regard to
the mixture and derived-from rules ... we vacate these rules
and remand them to the Agency." 950 F.2d at 765. The key
point here is the D.C. Circuit's use of the word "vacate": "'va-
cate', as the parties should well know, means 'to annul; to
cancel or rescind; to declare, to make, or to render, void; to
defeat; to deprive of force; to make of no authority or validity;
to set aside."' Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, 713 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Certainly an
administrative rule deprived of all force, authority, and valid-
ity does not have retroactive effect; indeed, it never was the
law. This is especially true because an incorrectly promul-
gated statute or rule is illegal to begin with and cannot be
used to impose sanctions on those who "violate" it. See
Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 313. In fact, the D.C. Circuit denied
EPA's subsequent motion to define the Shell ruling as voiding
the mixture rule only prospectively. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, No.
80-1532, et al. (D.C. Cir. March 5, 1992)(order denying mo-
tion for clarification).
Since the D.C. Circuit had already defined 'vacate' as
meaning retroactive invalidation of a regulation, there is no
evidence to indicate they meant anything else when they
choose to use that word in Shell. The Eighth Circuit pointed
this out when they held that the D.C. Circuit had retroac-
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tively vacated the mixture rule. United States v. Goodner
Bros. Aircraft Inc., 966 F.2d 380, 385 (8th Cir.) ("consistent
with the meaning of the word 'vacate', we find that invalida-
tion of the mixture rule [in Shell] applies retroactively") cert.
denied, 113 U.S. 967 (1993). The Shell court did recommend
that EPA consider repromulgating the mixture rule: "In light
of the dangers that may be posed by a discontinuity in the
regulation of hazardous wastes, however, the agency may
wish to reconsider reenacting the [mixture and derived-from]
rules .... ." 950 F.2d at 752. Taken out of context, this "dis-
continuity" language could perhaps be read to mean the mix-
ture rule was in effect until the D.C. Circuit "discontinued" it;
i.e., that the court set aside the rule on a merely prospective
basis. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the
court's own use and definition of the word "vacate" as describ-
ing a retroactive ruling. See Action on Smoking, 713 F.2d at
797. Furthermore, since the court said its invalidation of the
mixture rule would cause a discontinuity in the regulation of
hazardous waste, it clearly did not use the Fertilizer Institute
equity doctrine to maintain the mixture rule until it was
properly repromulgated. A rule kept in place would not cause
a discontinuity in the law. Thus, Chrysler's holding governs
an improperly promulgated rule, demanding the mixture rule
to be void ab initio.
More significantly, the court declared "we vacate [the
mixture rule] on procedural grounds". Shell, 950 F.2d at 752.
In other words, the court expressed no opinion as to the sub-
stantive merits. Because the rule under Chrysler was void ab
initio, substantive arguments were moot. In light of this evi-
dence, reading the 'discontinuity' language as describing a
prospective ruling is an unreasonable interpretation insuffi-
cient to defeat this case. See Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d at 384-
385.
The court expressed no problem with the concept of the
mixture rule; the problem was EPA's illegal promulgation of
it. Shell, 950 F.2d at 752. The D.C. Circuit obviously in-
tended to preserve the integrity of the APA rulemaking pro-
cedures. Otherwise, Shell would have maintained the
mixture rule in equity while giving EPA the opportunity to
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remedy its procedural mistakes. In fact, the D.C. Circuit only
one year earlier had endorsed this approach for cases when
equity demands retention of the defective rule or statute.
Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1312. Therefore, the decision to
vacate the mixture rule clearly shows that its fatal proce-
dural defects outweighed any reason to recognize the rule as
ever having been binding law. The court had no intention of
allowing the improperly promulgated rule to have any legal
effect; the rule was void from the beginning.
2. Supreme Court authority supports the D.C.
Circuit's retroactive approach.
Supreme Court authority decisively supports the D.C.
Circuit's clear decision to vacate the mixture rule retroac-
tively. The Court has unequivocally held that agency rules
not properly subjected to notice and comment are void ab ini-
tio. Chrysler, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). Thus, the Supreme Court
has endorsed and indeed required retroactivity in the same
procedural context that faced the D.C. Circuit in Shell.
Appellants may argue for the proposition that judicial
decisions can be applied prospectively. See Chevron Oil v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). However, the Court in subse-
quent decisions has clearly precluded the use of Chevron Oil
to justify selective prospectivity. "[W]e have never employed
Chevron Oil to the end of modified civil prospectivity." James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 538 (1991).
"[S]elective prospectivity also breaches the principle that liti-
gants in similar situations should be treated the same, a fun-
damental component of stare decisis and the rule of law
generally . . .selective prospectivity appears never to have
been endorsed in the civil context." Id. at 537-538.
In addition, the Court specifically said a court's retroac-
tive decision cannot be made prospective by another court.
"[T]he question is whether it is error to refuse to apply a rule
of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule
has done so. We hold that it is, principles of equality and
stare decisis here prevailing over any claim based on a Chev-
ron Oil analysis." Id. at 540; See also Harper v. Virginia
Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993). Therefore the mix-
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ture rule was invalidated retroactively and not in effect when
NURD discarded its roof acid mixture. As a result, NURD
cannot be held liable under it.
Affirming that the mixture rule was void ab initio until
its 1992 repromulgation will cause no relitigation problems.
Shell's retroactive invalidation would not lead to cases settled
under the mixture rule prior to 1992 being reopened. "Of
course, retroactivity in civil cases must be limited by the need
for finality ... once suit is barred by res judicata or by stat-
utes of limitation or repose, a new rule cannot reopen the
door already closed." Beam, 501 U.S. at 541 (relying on Chi-
cot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940)). In other words, no adjudicated cases can be re-
opened, thus preserving finality of judgment. Unlitigated
cases arising from pre-1992 incidents will not be subject to
the improperly promulgated mixture rule, thereby preserving
the D.C. Circuit's holding in Shell.
3. EPA did not appeal the Shell decision and therefore
EPA and BRANU are barred from arguing that
Shell was a prospective ruling.
EPA did not appeal the D.C. Circuit's decision in the
Shell. Instead, it simply repromulgated the rule the same
day the decision took effect. 57 Fed. Reg. 7628, 7630 (1992).
EPA's failure to appeal now collaterally estops both EPA and
BRANU from challenging the court's retroactive invalidation
of the mixture rule.
Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an is-
sue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is
dispositive in subsequent litigation involving a party or its
privies to the prior proceeding. Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). Generally, courts apply a four-part
test to see if collateral estoppel applies to a particular issue:
(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that in the
prior action, (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior
action, (3) deciding the issue was essential to the judgment in
the prior case, and (4) the party to be estopped was fully rep-
resented in the prior action. Levinson v. United States, 969
F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 505 (1992).
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All four requirements are satisfied here: (1) the issue here, as
in Shell, is the validity of the mixture rule before 1991, (2)
clearly all parties in Shell litigated that issue, (3) since the
D.C. Circuit invalidated the mixture rule retroactively,
whether or not the rule had retroactive effect was certainly
essential to the outcome of that case, and (4) EPA had full
opportunity to litigate the rule's validity. In fact, EPA even
requested the D.C. Circuit to clarify its decision as being pro-
spective only. Shell Oil v. EPA, No. 80-1532, et al. (D.C. Cir.
March 5, 1992)(order denying motion for clarification). Since
the collateral estoppel test is fully satisfied, EPA is barred
from arguing in this case that the Shell decision was
prospective.
BRANU is similarly barred due to EPA's failure to ap-
peal Shell. "[Interests [of collateral estoppel] are similarly
implicated when nonparties assume control over litigation in
which they have a direct financial or proprietary risk and
then seek to redetermine issues previously resolved." Mon-
tana, 404 U.S. at 154. Nonparties do not have to be 'privies'
in a strict legal sense in order to be subject to collateral estop-
pel. Id. at 155 n.5. Although BRANU was not involved in the
Shell litigation, it certainly had a financial interest in its out-
come. When the court declared the mixture rule void ab ini-
tio, BRANU lost all rights to damages under that rule for
NURD's actions between 1981 and 1983. BRANU is now col-
laterally estopped from contesting the court's disposition of
the retroactivity issue.
One subsequent Supreme Court decision, United States
v. Mendoza, did limit the use of collateral estoppel against
the government in cases where only one party was involved
in the prior litigation. 464 U.S. 154, 162-163 (1984). How-
ever, this holding applied only to the use of offensive collat-
eral estoppel against the government. Id. NURD seeks here
to use collateral estoppel only in a defensive manner; courts
have been much more receptive to this approach. Therefore,
Mendoza does not apply here and the Montana and Levinson
analyses estop EPA and BRANU from challenging Shell. As
a result, the mixture rule was unquestionably void ab initio
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until 1992, too late to apply to NURD's disposal of roof acid in
this case.
B. EPA did not repromulgate the mixture
rule retroactively.
1. Supreme Court authority says there is a strong
judicial presumption against
statutory retroactivity.
Appellants contend that even if Shell struck down the
mixture rule ab initio, EPA repromulgated it in 1992 with
full retroactive effect dating back to its original promulgation
in 1980. However, recent Supreme Court decisions seriously
call this assumption into question. "[T]he presumption
against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our juris-
prudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than
our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate
that individuals should have an opportunity to know what
the law is and to conform their expectations accordingly."
Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994).
2. This presumption is supported by the structure of
the Constitution.
The Landgraf Court cited a structuralist argument for
this presumption of prospectivity. The Court pointed out that
the Constitution has several provisions limiting or prohibit-
ing the issuance of retroactive statutes and rules. Landgraf,
114 S. Ct. at 1497. For example, the Ex Post Facto Clause
unequivocally prohibits retroactive penal legislation. U.S.
CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10. No Bills of Attainder are allowed for
retroactive punishment of disfavored persons or groups. Id.
The Takings Clause protects vested property rights. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. These provisions support a strong pre-
sumption against statutory retroactivity in civil cases.
3. The repromulgation language of the mixture rule
does not support giving it retroactive effect.
Under Landgraf (in accord with its presumption against
statutory retroactivity), "congressional enactments and ad-
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ministrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive
effect unless their language requires this result." 114 S. Ct.
at 1496 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488
U.S. 204, 208 (1981)). The language of the repromulgated
mixture rule does not require this result.
EPA's repromulgation states "today's decision to rein-
state the 'mixture' rule . . . maintains without interruption
the legal framework for the regulation of hazardous waste
originally established under RCRA in 1980." 57 Fed. Reg.
7628, 7630 (1992). However, this assumption rests entirely
on the immediately preceding sentence: "[T]he Agency be-
lieves that the Shell Oil decision is not intended to be retroac-
tive. As a result, today's decision to reinstate ... (followed by
previous quote)." Id. Therefore, EPA thought its repromul-
gation was retroactive only because it interpreted the Shell
decision as prospective. Since Shell was clearly a retroactive
decision, and since EPA is now estopped from challenging
that point, the repromulgation language certainly does not
meet the Landgraf standard of "requiring" retroactive appli-
cation of the mixture rule.
4. Public policy and judicial concerns dictate against
applying the repromulgated mixture
rule retroactively.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged an exception to its
prospective presumption. If retroactive application of a stat-
ute would support an important social policy, such applica-
tion may be proper. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 14-20 (1976). Certainly regulation of hazardous
wastes is a valid policy concern. However, it is not enough to
justify retroactive application of the mixture rule for several
reasons.
First, the mixture rule is not necessary for EPA to effec-
tively regulate hazardous wastes. The rule applies to any
mixture that contains some portion of a listed hazardous
waste, whether the mixture itself displays any hazardous
characteristics or not. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv)(1995). The
EPA has conceded that it can use this rule to prosecute the
disposal of a mixture without even proving that the mixture
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is actually harmful. 57 Fed. Reg. 7628, 7629 (1992) ("The
Agency has acknowledged that, in some cases, these [mixed]
wastes may present little risk".). On the other hand, any sub-
stance, even if a mixture, can be actionable by EPA if it does
exhibit characteristics of a hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.3(a)(2)(iii) (1995). It follows that EPA can regulate any
substance proven to have hazardous characteristics, even if it
is disposed of before 1992, and does not need the mixture rule
to be able to do so. In addition, all parties in this case have
stipulated that NURD's roof acid-fruit juice mixture is not a
characteristic waste. (J.A. 4).
Furthermore, retroactive application of the mixture rule
would also render the APA meaningless. An agency could re-
institute a rule the same day it is officially struck down (as
EPA did in this case), and the APA would have had no effect.
The APA must invalidate illegally issued rules in order to
protect traditional notions of due process. Agencies that do
not follow prescribed notice and comment should not be al-
lowed to have their resulting rules stand. Invalidating im-
properly promulgated agency rules gives agencies the
incentive to follow due process and to allow all potentially af-
fected parties the right to be heard through the notice and
comment process before the rules become final.
There is also a separation of powers concern here. EPA
should not be allowed to repromulgate its mixture rule retro-
actively because that would completely invalidate the D.C.
Circuit's holding in Shell and thus its authority to enforce the
APA. Holding EPA to a prospective repromulgation would
preserve and respect the authority of both the courts and the
APA itself. These concerns outweigh the minimal effect that
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C. Without a statutory mixture rule, NURD's disposed
mixture cannot be classified as an actionable
hazardous waste.
1. A mixed waste is not inherently a hazardous waste.
Some commentators have urged that a mixture of solid
waste and hazardous waste should be treated as a hazardous
waste, regardless of whether there is a written, binding mix-
ture rule. See generally James E. Satterfield, EPA's Mixture
Rule: Why the Fuss?, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 10712 (1994); Jeffrey
M. Gaba, The Mixture and Derived-From Rules Under RCRA:
Once a Hazardous Waste Always a Hazardous Waste?, 21
Envtl. L. Rep. 10033 (1991). However, this argument over-
looks EPA's past comments about the rule itself.
If listed hazardous wastes diluted by mixture are still ac-
tionable hazardous wastes, EPA would never have had to is-
sue the mixture rule in the first place. Its promulgation in
1980 and repromulgation in 1992 clearly show that EPA was
filling a gap in its regulations. In fact, EPA's explanatory
preamble to the 1980 mixture rule promulgation says
"M[w]ithout a 'mixture rule', generators of hazardous waste
could evade Subtitle C [hazardous disposal] requirements
simply by commingling listed wastes with nonhazardous
solid waste". 45 Fed. Reg. 33084, 33095 (1980). EPA then
made the same point in its 1992 repromulgation: "[w]ithout a
'mixture' rule, generators of hazardous waste could poten-
tially evade regulatory requirements by mixing listed hazard-
ous waste with nonhazardous solid waste" 57 Fed. Reg. 7628
(1992). It is entirely inconsistent for EPA to now argue that
the mixture rule was never necessary, and that mixtures
have always been subject to hazardous waste classification.
2. The majority of courts have refused to equitably
enforce the vacated mixture rule.
It should be argued that EPA's comments envisioned
only a possible loophole and that it was not conceding the
nonexistence of an implied mixture rule are also unpersua-
sive. The majority of current case law has refused to imply a
mixture rule. The D.C. Circuit recognized that its vacation of
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the mixture rule would lead to a "discontinuity" in the law
regarding hazardous waste disposal. Shell, 950 F.2d at 752.
There would be no such discontinuity if the mixture rule had
existed all along as an enforceable, unwritten rule. In addi-
tion, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have refused to enforce
the mixture rule absent its legal, written presence in EPA's
regulations. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 38 F.3d
862, 871 (7th Cir. 1994)("we must reject the notion that the
policy of the mixture rule is 'embodied' as a general principle
within the definition and that such a principle may operate to
reach wastes that would have been covered by the mixture
rule, but for its invalidation."); Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d at
380.
One standing decision has gone the other way. United
States v. Marine Shale Processors, Inc., No. CIV.A.90-1240,
1994 WL 419910 (W.D. La. Aug. 1, 1994). The district judge
held that "EPA promulgated the mixture rule out of an abun-
dance of caution in order to clarify that the regulatory scheme
• . . encompassed listed wastes which were combined with
other solid wastes.... I interpret the statute and regulations
as including such wastes even absent the mixture rule". Id.
at *3. However, one unreported decision has little or no per-
suasive value, especially when it has been contradicted by
three United States appellate circuit courts. Therefore, case
law has overwhelmingly held that the mixture rule's only
binding existence is as a properly promulgated, written rule.
In other words, the mixture rule is binding only on actions
taking place since 1992.
3. Policy concerns counsel against enforcing an
unwritten mixture rule.
The same policy concerns that weigh against a retroac-
tive reading of the mixture rule also counsel against enforc-
ing an unwritten mixture rule. First, since all characteristic
wastes, whether mixed or not, can still be regulated under
RCRA, very few if any truly dangerous waste mixtures would
go unregulated in the absence of a mixture rule. Also, enforc-
ing unwritten "regulations" would set a dangerous precedent
for avoiding the APA. The APA exists as a due process check
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on the enormous discretion Congress and the courts have
given to federal agencies like EPA. That is why such safe-
guards as the required notice and comment procedures are in
place. If agencies were allowed to somehow enforce unwrit-
ten rules without penalties, then the parties who stand to be
affected would have no recourse for participating in and voic-
ing their concerns through the rule implementation process.
Finally, unwritten rules would violate traditional due process
by not providing adequate notice to those who could be penal-
ized both civilly and criminally for not following them. In
short, the costs to society far outweigh any possible benefits
from implying and enforcing an unwritten mixture rule.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee New Union Roofing
and Drywall respectfully requests this Court to uphold the
District Court's decision disallowing a private cause of action
for restitution under RCRA § 7002, and the District Court's
holding that the mixture rule was vacated and therefore the
roof acid - fruit juice mixture was not a hazardous waste. Ap-
pellee also requests this Court reverse the District Court's
holding that the Congress was within its Commerce Clause
authority in enacting RCRA § 7002.
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